For links to the published versions and/or penultimate drafts see also my profiles on philpapers and

A Articles

with Hans Rott: “Was ist Nichtwissen?” (= What is ignorance?) 

in: Gunnar Duttge (ed.): Das sogenannte Recht auf Nichtwissen: Normatives Fundament und anwendungspraktische Geltungskraft. Münster: Mentis, forthcoming. (penultimate version available on request)

This paper is a contribution to an interdisciplinary anthology (law, sociology, medicine, philosophy) on the right not to know (e.g. the right not to know whether one carries the gene for Huntington’s disease). The purpose of our paper is to survey the current philosophical debate on the notion of ignorance. It is organised around arguments for and objections against the negation thesis, i.e. the thesis that one is ignorant that P if and only if one doesn’t know that P.

Keywords: ignorance, negation thesis, factivity, not wanting to know, right not to know, status quo bias

with Alex Wiegmann: “Folk epistemology and epistemic closure”

in: Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy 2 (2018), pp. 71–103. penultimate version

The closure principle – if S knows that P and knows that P entails Q, S knows that Q, as well – plays an important role in many epistemological debates. Against recent claims that it is not as intuitive as has often been claimed by philosophers (made e.g. by Turri), we present experimental data that suggests that closure is a principle of folk epistemology after all.

Keywords: epistemic closure, experimental philosophy

“A new argument for distinguishing rejection and denial”

in: Logique et Analyse 239 (2017), pp. 285–299. journal

This paper uses debates about epistemic principles (factivity, infallibilism, closure, KK, and so on) as a case study to argue for a distinction between two ‘negative’ attitudes, rejection and denial.

Keywords: rejection, denial, philosophical methodology 

“How to read the Tractatus sequentially”

in: Nordic Wittgenstein Review 5 (2016), pp. 91–124. philpapers

Hacker, Bazzocchi and Kuusela claim that understanding the numbering system is key to interpreting the Tractatus. I agree, but argue that their preferred interpretation of the numbering system – the tree reading – is inadequate. The sequential reading as explained in the paper is superior. Case studies are 4.016 (on hieroglyphs), 5.6331 (the eye analogy) and – the usual suspect – 6.54/7 (the ladder). More.

Keywords: Wittgenstein, Tractatus, numbering system, Hacker, Bazzocchi, Kuusela

“Epistemological disjunctivism’s genuine access problem”

in: Theoria 81 (2015), pp. 311–332. philpapers

This paper presents a version of the access problem (which is connected to McKinsey’s problem) and argues that epistemological disjunctivism cannot solve it. It turns out that the access problem is a problem for all versions of internalism, but that ED surprisingly, unlike other versions of internalism, lacks the resources for a convincing response.

Keywords: epistemological disjunctivism, access problem, transparency, Pritchard

 “Defending the ignorance view of sceptical scenarios”

in: International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (2015), pp. 269–295. philpapers

This paper is a follow-up to my 2013 Erkenntnis paper (see below). It discusses some arguments for and objections to the ignorance view of sceptical scenarios published in the meantime and does what the title claims it does, or so I hope.

Keywords: scepticism, sceptical scenarios, ignorance view, KK

“Transmission arguments against knowledge closure are still fallacious”

in: Synthese 191 (2014), pp. 2617–2632. philpapers

What does it mean for knowledge if a necessary condition for knowledge isn’t closed? Some think that this entails, or at least suggests, that knowledge isn’t closed either (Brueckner, Murphy, Bernecker, …), whereas others think that this doesn’t do this at all (Warfield). I defend the second view.

Keywords: epistemic closure, fallacy fallacy, necessary conditions for knowledge

“Sceptical scenarios are not error-possibilities”

in: Erkenntnis 78 (2013), pp. 59–72. philpapers

There are two basic options for understanding sceptical scenarios: They are either error-possibilities or ignorance-possibilities, i.e. they are either possibilities in which most of its victims empirical beliefs are false or fall short of knowledge (not necessarily because they are false). I argue against the error view.

Keywords: scepticism, sceptical scenarios, error- vs ignorance-possibilities, global vs. local scenarios, ignorance view 

“Scepticism, infallibilism, fallibilism”

in: Discipline Filosofiche 22 (2012), pp. 49–70. (Special issue, European Epistemology Network meeting Bologna und Modena 2012) philpapers, pdf

Do sceptical arguments depend on infallibilism? If they do, the response to scepticism seems easy: Just give up infallibilism! In this paper I distinguish several versions of fallibilism/infallibilism and argue that scepticism doesn’t depend in any problematic sense on infallibilism. Interestingly, this paper is my most downloaded paper on I guess that is because half of it is concerned with defining fallibilism/infallibilism…

Keywords: scepticism, infallibilism, fallibilism

“Warum Wissen nicht der allgemeinste faktive mentale Zustand ist” (= Why knowledge is not the most factive mental state”)

in: Grazer Philosophische Studien 83 (2011), pp. 33–66. philpapers

This paper interprets and rejects Williamson’s proposal that knowledge is the most general factive mental state. Two objections are defended, an example-based objection  against the entailment thesis (seeing that, regretting that, … entail knowing) and a methodological objection.

Keywords: Williamson, knowledge as the most general factive mental state, entailment thesis

“Kripkes Wittgensteins skeptische Lösung und die Metaphysik des Meinens” (= Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s sceptical solution and the metaphysics of meaning”)

in: Martin Grajner and Dolf Rami (ed.): Wahrheit, Bedeutung, Existenz. Heusenstamm: Ontos, 2010, pp. 125–180. pdf

This paper is partly ‘single release’, partly ‘outtake’ from my PhD thesis. It interprets Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s sceptical solution as the default & challenge (or, inclination & correction) conception of rule-following and argues that this interpretation allows to defend the sceptical solution against three common objections to it. I also explain in which sense the sceptical solution is ‘sceptical’ and in which sense there are no ‘meaning facts’.

Keywords: rule-following, Kripke’s Wittgenstein, sceptical solution, default & challenge conception of rule-following

B Book reviews

Anne Meylan: Foundations of an ethics of belief.

in: Zeitschrift für philosophische Literatur 2 (2014), pp. 64–71. journal (open access)

Jochen Briesen: Skeptische Paradoxa.

in: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 60 (2012), pp. 821–825. philpapers

Anandi Hattiangadi: Oughts and thoughts.

in: European Journal of Philosophy 17 (2009), pp. 336–341. philpapers

C Handbook entries

“Normativität der Bedeutung” (= Normativity of meaning)

in: Nikola Kompa (ed.): Handbuch Sprachphilosophie. Stuttgart: Metzler, 2015, pp. 351–360.

with Felix Mühlhölzer: “Hilary Putnam”

in: Julian Nida-Rümelin and Elif Özmen (ed.): Philosophie der Gegenwart in Einzeldarstellungen. Stuttgart: Kröner, 2007, pp. 505–517.

also in: Julian Nida-Rümelin and Elif Özmen (ed.): Klassiker der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts. Stuttgart: Kröner, 2007, pp. 190–200.